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1 Introduction
We investigate a choice of options for a foreign innovating firm to license its technology
for producing the high quality good to a domestic incumbent firm or to enter the domestic
market with or without license under vertical diﬀerentiation with convex cost functions. If
cost functions are non-linear, the domestic market and the foreign market are not separated,
and the results depend on the relative size of those markets. We consider product innovation
as quality improvement of goods not process innovation such as cost-reducing.
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986) under the assumption of linear demand
and cost functions with cost-reducing innovation it was argued that in an oligopoly when the
number of firms is small (or large), entry with license strategy by the innovating firm, which is
a strategy to enter the market and at the same time license its cost-reducing technology to an
incumbent firm, is more profitable than license without entry strategy, which is a strategy to
license its technology to an incumbent firm without entering the market. However, their result
depends on their definition of a license fee in the case where the innovating firm licenses its
technology to an incumbent firm and does not enter the market. Interpreting their analyses in a
duopoly model, they defined the license fee in the license without entry case by the diﬀerence
between the profit of an incumbent firm in that case and its monopoly profit before entry
and license by the innovating firm. However, we can think that if the negotiation between
the innovating firm and an incumbent firm about the license fee breaks down, the innovating
firm can enter the market without license to an incumbent firm. If the innovating firm does
not enter the market nor license, its profit is zero. However, if it enters the market, its profit
is positive. Therefore, such a threat is credible, and hence an incumbent firm must pay the
diﬀerence between its profit in the license without entry case and its profit in the entry without
license case as a license fee. Using an alternative definition of a license fee we can show the
result which is converse to the result in Kamien and Tauman (1986) that in a duopoly license
without entry strategy is optimal for the innovator. In this paper we will extend this result to a
situation of product innovation in an international duopoly.
We assume that the cost functions of Firms A and B are quadratic. They are denoted by
c.xAC yA/2 and cx2B , where c is a positive constant. Since we focus attention to the problem
of quality choice, we assume that both low-quality and high quality goods are produced at the
same cost. With non-linear cost functions the domestic market and the foreign market are not
separated, and the results depend on the relative size of the foreign market to the domestic
market. We will show the following results. When the foreign market is small, the foreign
innovating firm chooses license with entry strategy, and the foreign market is not small, it
chooses license without entry strategy.
In the next section we review some related studies. In Section 3 we present the model. In
Section 4 we study the general case, and in Section 5 we investigate the optimal strategies for
the foreign innovating firm in the case of uniform distribution of consumers’ taste parameter.
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2 Literature review
Various studies focus on technology adoption or R&D investment in duopoly or oligopoly.
Most of them analyze the relation between the technology licensor and licensee. Sinha (2009)
compared the strategy to license with entry by FDI and the strategy to license with entry by
export. He showed that each of this two strategy have diﬀerent optimal combination of fixed
fee and royalty. However, the strategy to license without entry is not considered. It is the
main target of this paper. The diﬀerence of means of contracts, which comprise royalties,
upfront fixed fees, combinations of these two, and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and
Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002) showed that outside innovators prefer auctions,
but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This topic is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the
Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does not have production capacity. Wang and Yang
(2004) considered the case when the licensor has production capacity under the Stackelberg
duopoly. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely, when the
licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of royalties
and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given, and they
did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside innovators,
who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies of new
entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants with old
technology, and argued that while a low license fee can be used to deter the entry of potential
entrants, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is not analyzed.
Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure determined by the
potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the fixed fee and zero
royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are exogenously given.
Below, we present a brief review of studies that analyzed related topics. A Cournot oligopoly
with fixed fee under cost asymmetry was analyzed by La Manna (1993). He showed that if
technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower cost firm always has the incentive to transfer
its technology; hence, while a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be fully asymmetric, there
exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. On the other hand, using
cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto (2008) analyzed bargaining between a licensor
with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. Recent research focuses on market
structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et. al. (2013) found
a non-monotonic relation between intensity of competition and innovation. Also, Pal (2010)
showed that technology adoption may change the market outcome. The social welfare is larger
in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. However, if we consider technology
adoption, Cournot competition may result in higher social welfare than Bertrand competition
under a diﬀerentiated goodsmarket. Hattori and Tanaka (2014), (2015) studied the adoption of
new technology in Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg duopoly. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012)
presented an analysis of the eﬀectiveness of research and development (R&D) subsidies in an
oligopolistic model in the cases of international competition and cooperation in R&D. Hattori
and Tanaka (2016) analyzed similar problems about product innovation, that is, introduction
of higher quality good in a duopoly with vertical product diﬀerentiation.
Empirical studies focus on the relationship betweenmultinational corporation’s behavior and
development country’s economic growth. For example, Gould and Gruben (1996) focused
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on the licensing and estimated the relationship between intellectual property rights protection
level and economic growth. Also, Saggi (2002) investigated the spillover caused by FDI and
trade, and the relationship between FDI and economic growth of the host country.
3 Themodel
There are two countries and two firms Firm A in Country A and Firm B in Country B. Call
Country A the foreign country and Country B the domestic country; Firm A the foreign firm
and Firm B the domestic firm. Our model of vertical product diﬀerentiation is according to
Mussa and Rosen (1978), Bonanno and Haworth (1998) and Tanaka (2001). At present,
Firm B supplies the low-quality good, whose quality is kL, to the domestic market. Firm A
has a technology to produce the high-quality good whose quality is kH , where kH > kL > 0,
and at present it supplies the high-quality good to the foreign market. kH and kL are fixed.
Firm A have three options. One option is to enter the domestic market without licensing its
technology for producing the high-quality good to Firm B, the second option is to license its
technology to Firm B without entering the domestic market, and the third option is to enter
the domestic market with license to Firm B. If Firm A enters with license, both firms supply
the high-quality good in the domestic market. If Firm A enters without license, it supplies the
high-quality good and Firm B supplies the low-quality good in the domestic market. Since the
focus of this paper is a choice of entry or license by the foreign innovating firm, we assume
that Firm B does not enter the foreign market.
In the domestic market there is a continuum of consumers with the same income, denoted
by y, but diﬀerent values of the taste parameter  . Each consumer buys at most one unit of the
good. If a consumer with parameter  buys one unit of a good of quality k at price p, his utility
is equal to y   pC k. If a consumer does not buy the good, his utility is equal to his income
y. The parameter  is distributed according to a smooth distribution function  D F./ in
the interval 0 <   1.  denotes the probability that the taste parameter is smaller than or
equal to  . The inverse function of F./ is denoted by G./. The size of consumers in the
domestic market is normalized as one. The structure of the foreign market is essentially the
same as that of the domestic market, and so consumers’ taste parameter distributes according
to the distribution function F./. However, only the high-quality good is supplied there, and
the size of consumers in the foreign market may be diﬀerent from 1. It is denoted by t , which
is a positive number. If t > 1, the foreign market is larger than the domestic market, and if
t < 1, the foreign market is smaller than the domestic market.
Let pL be the price of the good of quality kL and pH be the price of the good of quality
kH ; and let xA and xB be the supplies of Firms A and B in the domestic market. Let qH be
the price of the high-quality good, and yA be the supply of Firm A in the foreign market.
Assume that the cost functions of the firms are quadratic. The cost function of Firm A is
cA.xA C yA/2 and the cost function of Firm B is cBx2B .
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4 General analysis
4.1 Firms’ behavior
(1) Assume that Firm A enters the domestic market without license to Firm B. Then, Firm A
supplies the high-quality good, and Firm B supplies the low-quality good in the domestic
market. Let L be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer in the domestic
market is indiﬀerent between buying nothing and buying the low-quality good. Then,
L D pLkL . Let H be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer in the
domestic market is indiﬀerent between buying the low-quality good and the high-quality
good. Then, H D pH pLkH kL . We assume 0 < L < H < 1. The direct demand functions
of the high-quality and the low-quality goods are
xH D 1   F

pH   pL
kH   kL

and
xL D F

pH   pL
kH   kL

  F

pL
kL

:
xH and xL denote the supplies of, respectively, the good of quality kH and the good of
quality kL in the domestic market. We have 0 < xL < 1, 0 < xH < 1, xA D xH and
xB D xL. The inverse demand functions of the high-quality and the low-quality goods
in the domestic market are
pH D .kH   kL/G.1   xA/C kLG.1   xA   xB/
and
pL D kLG.1   xA   xB/:
Similarly, let H be the value of  for which the corresponding consumer in the foreign
market is indiﬀerent between buying nothing and buying the high-quality good. Then
H D qHkH . The direct demand function is yH D t

1   F

qH
kH

. yH denotes the
supply of the good of quality kH in the foreign market. We have 0 < yH < t and
yA D yH . The inverse demand function of the high quality good in the foreign market
is
qH D kHG

1   yA
t

:
The profits of Firms A and B are written as
A D Œ.kH kL/G.1 xA/CkLG.1 xA xB/xACkHG

1   yA
t

yA c.xACyA/2
and
B D kLG.1   xA   xB/xB   cx2B :
The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
.kH   kL/G.1   xA/C kLG.1   xA   xB/   .kH   kL/G 0.1   xA/xA
  kLG 0.1   xA   xB/xA   2c.xA C yA/ D 0;
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kHG

1   yA
t

  kHG 0

1   yA
t
 yA
t
  2c.xA C yA/ D 0
and
kLG.1   xA   xB/   kLG 0.1   xA   xB/xB   2cxB D 0:
Denote the profits of Firms A and B in this case by eA and eB .
(2) Assume that Firm A licenses its technology for producing the high-quality good to Firm
B without entering the domestic market. Then, only the high-quality good is supplied
in both the domestic and the foreign markets. Let H be the value of  for which the
corresponding consumer in the domestic market is indiﬀerent between buying nothing
and buying the high-quality good. Then H D pHkH . The direct demand function is
xH D 1   F

pH
kH

. xH is the supply of the high-quality good in the domestic market.
We have 0 < xH < 1 and xB D xH . The inverse demand function of the high quality
good in the domestic market is
pH D kHG.1   xB/:
The profit and the condition for profit maximization of Firm B are
B D kHG.1   xB/xB   cx2B   L;
kHG.1   xB/   kHG 0.1   xB/xB   2cxB D 0:
L is the license fee. The structure of the foreign market is the same as that in the previous
case. The profit and the condition for profit maximization of Firm A are
A D kHG

1   yA
t

yA   cy2A C L;
kHG

1   yA
t

  kHG 0

1   yA
t
 yA
t
  2cyA D 0:
If the negotiation between Firms A and Firm B about the license fee breaks down, Firm
A can enter the market without license. Therefore, Firm B must pay the diﬀerence
between its profit excluding the license fee in this case and its profit in the previous entry
without license case as a license fee. The license fee should be equal to
L D B C L   eB :
This equation means that the license fee is determined so that B D eB is satisfied.
Denote the profits of Firms A and B in this case by  lA and  lB , and denote the license
fee by Ll .
(3) Assume that Firm A enters the domestic market and at the same time licenses its
technology to Firm B. Then, only the high-quality good is supplied in both the domestic
and the foreign markets. The direct demand function in the domestic market is xH D
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1   F

pH
kH

. We have 0 < xH < 1 and xA C xB D xH . The inverse demand function
of the high quality good in the domestic market is
pH D kHG.1   xA   xB/:
The structure of the foreign market is the same as that in the previous cases. The profits
of Firms A and B are
A D kHG.1   xA   xB/xA C kHG

1   yA
t

yA   c.xA C yA/2 C L
and
B D kHG.1   xA   xB/xB   cx2B   L:
L is the license fee. The conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
kHG.1   xA   xB/   kHG 0.1   xA   xB/xA   2c.xA C yA/ D 0;
kHG

1   yA
t

  kHG 0

1   yA
t
 yA
t
  2c.xA C yA/ D 0
and
kHG.1   xA   xB/   kHG 0.1   xA   xB/xB   2cxB D 0:
Similarly to the previous case, if the negotiation between Firms A and Firm B about the
license fee breaks down, Firm A can enter the market without license. Therefore, Firm
B must pay the diﬀerence between its profit excluding the license fee in this case and its
profit in the previous entry without license case as a license fee. The license fee should
be equal to
L D B C L   eB :
This means B D eB . Denote the profits of Firms A and B in this case by elA and elB ,
and denote the license fee by Lel .
4.2 The optimal strategies
Comparing  lA C Ll , eA and elA C Lel , the optimal strategies for Firm A are as follows.
(1) If  lA C Ll is the maximum, license without entry strategy is optimal.
(2) If eA is the maximum, entry without license strategy is optimal.
(3) If elA C Lel is the maximum, entry with license strategy is optimal.
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5 Uniform distribution case
5.1 Three cases
Let us suppose that  D F./ has a uniform distribution, then  D  . We consider three cases
about the value of t as follows.
(1) t > kH .2kHkLC2ckH k
2
L/
ck2L
.
Then, Firm A never enters the domestic market, and the entry without license case and
the entry with license case in the following sub-section do not exist.
(2) kH
c
C 2 < t  kH .2kHkLC2ckH k2L/
ck2L
.
Then, Firm A does not enter the domestic market when it licenses its technology to Firm
B, and the entry with license case does not exist.
We can verify
kH .2kHkL C 2ckH   k2L/
ck2L
 

kH
c
C 2

D 2.kH   kL/.kHkL C ckL C ckH /
ck2L
> 0:
(3) t  kH
c
C 2.
Then, Firm A may enter the domestic market with or without license.
5.2 Firms’ behavior
(1) Entry without license case.
Assume that Firm A enters the domestic market without license to Firm B. Then, Firm A
supplies the high-quality good, and Firm B supplies the low-quality good in the domestic
market. The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and B are
.kH   kL/.1   xA/C kL.1   xA   xB/   kHxA   2c.xA C yA/ D 0;
kH

1   yA
t

  kH yA
t
  2c.xA C yA/ D 0
and
kL.1   xA   xB/   kLxB   2cxB D 0:
The equilibrium values of the variables are obtained as follows.
pH D kH .2kHkL C 2ckH   k
2
L/.2ct C kH C 2c/
4ckHkLt C 4c2kH t   kHk2L C 4k2HkL C 4ckHkL C 4ck2H C 4c2kH   ck2Lt
;
pL D kHkL.kL C 2c/.2ct C kH C 2c/
4ckHkLt C 4c2kH t   kHk2L C 4k2HkL C 4ckHkL C 4ck2H C 4c2kH   ck2Lt
;
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xA D 2k
2
HkL C 2ck2H   ck2Lt   kHk2L
4ckHkLt C 4c2kH t   kHk2L C 4k2HkL C 4ckHkL C 4ck2H C 4c2kH   ck2Lt
;
xB D kHkL.2ct C kH C 2c/
4ckHkLt C 4c2kH t   kHk2L C 4k2HkL C 4ckHkL C 4ck2H C 4c2kH   ck2Lt
;
A D kHA
4.ck2Lt   4ckHkLt   4c2kH t C kHk2L   4k2HkL   4ckHkL   4ck2H   4c2kH /2
:
About the value of A please see Appendix.
B D k
2
Hk
2
L.kL C c/.2ct C kH C 2c/2
.ck2Lt   4ckHkLt   4c2kH t C kHk2L   4k2HkL   4ckHkL   4ck2H   4c2kH /2
;
qH D kH .4kHkL C 4ckH   k
2
L/.2ct C kH C 2c/
2.4ckHkLt C 4c2kH t   kHk2L C 4k2HkL C 4ckHkL C 4ck2H C 4c2kH   ck2Lt /
and
yA D .2ck
2
L C 4k2HkL C 4ck2H   kHk2L/t
2.4ckHkLt C 4c2kH t   kHk2L C 4k2HkL C 4ckHkL C 4ck2H C 4c2kH   ck2Lt /
:
If t > kH .2kHkLC2ckH k
2
L/
ck2L
, xA D 0, that is, Firm A does not enter the domestic market.
(2) License without entry case.
Assume that FirmA licenses its technology for producing the high-quality good to FirmB
without entering the domestic market. The first order conditions for profit maximization
of Firms A and B are
kH .1   xB/   kHxB   2cxB D 0;
kH

1   yA
t

  kH yA
t
  2cyA D 0:
The equilibrium values of the variables are obtained as follows.
pH D kH .kH C 2c/
2.kH C c/ ; xB D
kH
2.kH C c/;
 lB D
k2H
4.kH C c/;
yA D kH t
2.ct C kH / ;
 lA D
k2H t
4.ct C kH /
and
qH D kH .2ct C kH /
2.ct C kH / :
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The license fee is equal to
Ll D k
2
HB
B
where
B D4.kH C c/.ck2Lt   4ckHkLt   4c2kH t C kHk2L   4k2HkL   4ckHkL
  4ck2H   4c2kH /2:
About the value of B please see Appendix.
The total profit of Firm A including the license fee is
 lA C Ll D
k2HC
C
where
C D4.kH C c/.ct C kH /.ck2Lt   4ckHkLt   4c2kH t C kHk2L   4k2HkL
  4ckHkL   4ck2H   4c2kH /2:
About the value of C please see Appendix.
(3) Entry with license case.
Assume that Firm A enters the domestic market and at the same time licenses its
technology to Firm B. The first order conditions for profit maximization of Firms A and
B are
kH .1   xA   xB/   kHxA   2c.xA C yA/ D 0;
kH

1   yA
t

  kH yA
t
  2c.xA C yA/ D 0
and
kH .1   xA   xB/   kHxB   2cxB D 0:
The equilibrium values of the variables are
pH D kH .kH C 2c/.2ct C kH C 2c/
3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2
;
xA D kH .kH C 2c   ct/
3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2
;
xB D kH .2ct C kH C 2c/
3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2
;
yA D 3kH .kH C 2c/t
2.3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2/
;
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A D k
2
HD
4.3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2/2
where
D D9ck2H t2 C 28c2kH t2 C 16c3t2 C 9k3H t C 40ck2H t C 60c2kH t
C 32c3t C 4k3H C 20ck2H C 32c2kH C 16c3;
B D k
2
H .kH C c/.2ct C kH C 2c/2
.3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2/2
and
qH D kH .3kH C 4c/.2ct C kH C 2c/
2.3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2/
:
The license fee is equal to
Lel D k
2
H .kL   kH /.kHkL C ckL C ckH /.2ct C kH C 2c/2E
E
where
E D.3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2/2.ck2Lt   4ckHkLt   4c2kH t C kHk2L
  4k2HkL   4ckHkL   4ck2H   4c2kH /2
and
E Dc2k2Lt2   16c2kHkLt2   16c3kLt2   16c3kH t2   16c4t2 C 2ckHk2Lt
  32ck2HkLt   64c2kHkLt   32c3kLt   32c2k2H t   64c3kH t   32c4t
C k2Hk2L   16k3HkL   48ck2HkL   48c2kHkL   16c3kL   16ck3H
  48c2k2H   48c3kH   16c4:
The total profit of Firm A including the license fee is
elA C Lel D
k2HF
F
where
F D4.3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2/2.ck2Lt   4ckHkLt   4c2kH t
C kHk2L   4k2HkL   4ckHkL   4ck2H   4c2kH /2:
About the value of F please see Appendix.
If t > kHC2
c
, xA D 0, that is, Firm A does not enter the market when it licenses its
technology to Firm B.
11
5.3 The optimal strategies
We explore the optimal strategies of Firm A in each case of the value of t .
(1) Assume t > kH .2kHkLC2ckH k
2
L/
ck2L
. Then, Firm A never enters the domestic market.
Thus, its optimal strategy is to license without entry.
(2) Assume kH
c
C2 < t  kH .2kHkLC2ckH k2L/
ck2L
. Firm A does not enter the domestic market
when it licenses its technology to Firm B. Comparing the profit of Firm A when it
licenses its technology to Firm B without entry and its profit when it enters the market
without license,
 lA C Ll   eA D
kHG
G
where
G D4.kH C c/.ct C kH /.ck2Lt   4ckHkLt   4c2kH t C kHk2L   4k2HkL
  4ckHkL   4ck2H   4c2kH /2
and
G D3c3kHk4Lt3 C 4c4k4Lt3 C 24c3k2Hk3Lt3 C 16c4kHk3Lt3   16c3k3Hk2Lt3
C 24c4k2Hk2Lt3 C 16c5kHk2Lt3   32c4k3HkLt3   16c5k3H t3 C 9c2k2Hk4Lt2
C 16c3kHk4Lt2 C 4c4k4Lt2 C 40c2k3Hk3Lt2 C 56c3k2Hk3Lt2 C 32c4kHk3Lt2
  48c2k4Hk2Lt2 C 8c3k3Hk2Lt2 C 56c4k2Hk2Lt2 C 32c5kHk2Lt2   96c3k4HkLt2
  64c4k3HkLt2   48c4k4H t2   32c5k3H t2 C 9ck3Hk4Lt C 20c2k2Hk4Lt C 8c3kHk4Lt
C 12ck4Hk3Lt C 36c2k3Hk3Lt C 48c3k2Hk3Lt C 16c4kHk3Lt   32ck5Hk2Lt   36c2k4Hk2Lt
C 20c3k3Hk2Lt C 48c4k2Hk2Lt C 16c5kHk2Lt   64c2k5HkLt   96c3k4HkLt   32c4k3HkLt
  32c3k5H t   48c4k4H t   16c5k3H t C 3k4Hk4L C 8ck3Hk4L C 4c2k2Hk4L   4k5Hk3L
  4ck4Hk3L C 16c2k3Hk3L C 16c3k2Hk3L   4ck5Hk2L   4c2k4Hk2L C 16c3k3Hk2L C 16c4k2Hk2L:
This is positive for reasonable values of variables if t > kH
c
C 2. In Figure 1 we depict
an example of this case assuming kH D 10 and kL D c D 5. Then, kHc C 2 D 4 and
kH .2kHkLC2ckH k2L/
ck2L
D 14.
Somediscussion When FirmA licenses its technology to FirmB, the domestic market
becomes a monopoly in which Firm B produces the good at lower cost. Then,  lB is
larger than eB plus the profit of Firm A in the domestic market when it enters. The
license fee in the case of license without entry is  lB  eB which is larger than the profit
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Figure 1: Illustration of  lA C Ll   eA
of Firm A in the domestic market. Then, the total profit of Firm A when it licenses its
technology to Firm B without entry should be larger than the total profit when it enters
the domestic market without license, and license without entry strategy is optimal for
Firm A.
(3) Assume t  kH
c
C2. Let us compare the profit of Firm A when it licenses its technology
to Firm B with entry and its profit when it enters the market without license. Then,
elA C Lel   eA D
kH .kH   kL/.kHkL C ckL C ckH /.2ct C kH C 2c/H
H
where
H D.3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2/2.ck2Lt   4ckHkLt   4c2kH t C kHk2L   4k2HkL
  4ckHkL   4ck2H   4c2kH /2
and
H D2c3kHk2Lt3 C 8c4k2Lt3 C 40c3k2HkLt3 C 32c4kHkLt3 C 40c4k2H t3 C 32c5kH t3
C 11c2k2Hk2Lt2 C 38c3kHk2Lt2 C 16c4k2Lt2 C 76c2k3HkLt2 C 160c3k2HkLt2
C 96c4kHkLt2 C 76c3k3H t2 C 160c4k2H t2 C 96c5kH t2 C 16ck3Hk2Lt C 56c2k2Hk2Lt
C 44c3kHk2Lt C 8c4k2Lt C 32ck4HkLt C 132c2k3HkLt C 200c3k2HkLt C 96c4kHkLt
C 32c2k4H t C 132c3k3H t C 200c4k2H t C 96c5kH t C 7k4Hk2L C 26ck3Hk2L C 28c2k2Hk2L
C 8c3kHk2L   4k5HkL C 4ck4HkL C 56c2k3HkL C 80c3k2HkL C 32c4kHkL   4ck5H
C 4c2k4H C 56c3k3H C 80c4k2H C 32c5kH :
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Figure 2: Illustration of elA C Lel   eA
This is positive for reasonable values of the variables. Thus, elA CLel > eA, and entry
only (entry without license) strategy is never the optimal strategy for Firm A.
In Figure 2 we depict an example of elA C Lel   eA assuming kH D 10; kL D 5 and
c D 5.
Let us compare the profit of Firm A when it licenses its technology to Firm B without
entry and its profit when it enters the market with license to Firm B. Then,
elA C Lel   . lA C Ll/ D
k3H .ct   kH   2c/I
4.kH C c/.ct C kH /.3ckH t C 4c2t C 3k2H C 8ckH C 4c2/2
where
I D 11c2kH t2C12c3t2C12ck2H tC18c2kH tC4c3tCk3H  2ck2H  12c2kH  8c3:
Solving  lA D elA , we get the following solution
t D
.kH C c/
q
25k2H C 68ckH C 100c2   6k2H   9ckH   2c2
11ckH C 12c2 :
This is the threshold value of the relative size of the foreign market to the domestic
market. If t < t,  lACLl < elA CLel , and if t > t,  lACLl > elA CLel . Thus, if
the foreign market is small relatively to the domestic market, license with entry strategy
is optimal for Firm A, and if the foreign market is not small relatively to the domestic
market, license without entry (license only) strategy is optimal. In Figure 3 we depict
an example of elA C Lel   . lA C Ll/ assuming kH D 10; kL D 5 and c D 5.
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Figure 3: Illustration of elA C Lel   . lA C Ll/
When kH  10.
p
2C 1/, t  0. Therefore, if kH  10.
p
2C 1/, there is no positive
t, and license without entry strategy is optimal. In Figure 4 we depict the relation
between kH and t assuming c D 5.
Some discussion Let us provide some intuition behind this result. If the foreign
innovating firm chooses license without entry strategy, the domestic market becomes a
monopoly, and the incumbent firm gets the large profit. Then, the license fee is large,
and the larger the magnitude of the innovation (kH is large) is, the larger the license fee
is. If the foreign market is not small relatively to the domestic market, the profit of the
foreign firm when it enters the domestic market as a duopolist is small relatively to the
profit it earns in the foreign market as a monopolist. Therefore, if the size of the foreign
market is not small, the foreign innovating firm does not have an incentive to enter the
domestic market. On the other hand, if the size of the foreign market is small and the
magnitude of the innovation is not so large, its total profit when it enters the domestic
market with license is larger than the total profit when it chooses license without entry
strategy.
We have shown the following results.
Proposition 1. (1) When t > kH .2kHkLC2ckH k
2
L/
ck2L
or kH
c
C 2 < t  kH .2kHkLC2ckH k2L/
ck2L
,
Firm A does not enter the domestic market, and its optimal strategy is to license without
entry.
(2) When t  kH
c
C 2;
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Figure 4: Relations among kH and t
i) Entry without license strategy is never the optimal strategy for Firm A.
ii) If the ratio of the size of the foreign market relatively to the domestic market is
small, license with entry strategy is optimal for Firm A.
iii) If the ratio of the size of the foreign market relatively to the domestic market is not
small, license without entry strategy is optimal for Firm A.
iv) If kH is large (kH  10.
p
2C1/), license without entry strategy is always optimal.
6 Concluding Remark
We have examined the optimal strategies for the foreign innovator in international duopoly
when it can enter the domestic market under vertical diﬀerentiation, and have shown that its
optimal strategy depends on the relative size of the foreign and the domestic markets.
In the future research we will extend the analysis to a case of more general demand and cost
functions, and oligopoly with more than two firms.
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Appendix: Details of calculation
A DckHk4Lt2 C 4c2k4Lt2   8ck2Hk3Lt2 C 16ck3Hk2Lt2   8c2k2Hk2Lt2 C 32c2k3HkLt2 C 16c3k3H t2
C k2Hk4Lt C 8ckHk4Lt C 4c2k4Lt   8k3Hk3Lt   24ck2Hk3Lt C 16k4Hk2Lt C 24ck3Hk2Lt   24c2k2Hk2Lt
C 32ck4HkLt C 64c2k3HkLt C 16c2k4H t C 32c3k3H t C 4k2Hk4L C 4ckHk4L   16k3Hk3L
  16ck2Hk3L C 16k4Hk2L   16c2k2Hk2L C 32ck4HkL C 32c2k3HkL C 16c2k4H C 16c3k3H :
B Dc2k4Lt2   24c2kHk3Lt2   16c3k3Lt2 C 16c2k2Hk2Lt2   24c3kHk2Lt2   16c4k2Lt2 C 32c3k2HkLt2
C 16c4k2H t2 C 2ckHk4Lt   32ck2Hk3Lt   56c2kHk3Lt   32c3k3Lt C 32ck3Hk2Lt   56c3kHk2Lt   32c4k2Lt
C 64c2k3HkLt C 64c3k2HkLt C 32c3k3H t C 32c4k2H t C k2Hk4L   12k3Hk3L   28ck2Hk3L   32c2kHk3L
  16c3k3L C 16k4Hk2L C 20ck3Hk2L   12c2k2Hk2L   32c3kHk2L   16c4k2L C 32ck4HkL C 64c2k3HkL
C 32c3k2HkL C 16c2k4H C 32c3k3H C 16c4k2H :
C Dc2kHk4Lt3 C 2c3k4Lt3   8c2k2Hk3Lt3   32c3kHk3Lt3   16c4k3Lt3 C 16c2k3Hk2Lt3 C 24c3k2Hk2Lt3
  32c4kHk2Lt3   16c5k2Lt3 C 32c3k3HkLt3 C 64c4k2HkLt3 C 16c4k3H t3 C 32c5k2H t3 C 2ck2Hk4Lt2
C 5c2kHk4Lt2   16ck3Hk3Lt2   80c2k2Hk3Lt2   80c3kHk3Lt2   32c4k3Lt2 C 32ck4Hk2Lt2
C 96c2k3Hk2Lt2   16c3k2Hk2Lt2   80c4kHk2Lt2   32c5k2Lt2 C 64c2k4HkLt2 C 224c3k3HkLt2
C 128c4k2HkLt2 C 32c3k4H t2 C 112c4k3H t2 C 64c5k2H t2 C k3Hk4Lt C 4ck2Hk4Lt   8k4Hk3Lt
  60ck3Hk3Lt   92c2k2Hk3Lt   64c3kHk3Lt   16c4k3Lt C 16k5Hk2Lt
C 88ck4Hk2Lt C 52c2k3Hk2Lt   60c3k2Hk2Lt   64c4kHk2Lt   16c5k2Lt
C 32ck5HkLt C 192c2k4HkLt C 224c3k3HkLt C 64c4k2HkLt C 16c2k5H t
C 96c3k4H t C 112c4k3H t C 32c5k2H t C k3Hk4L   12k4Hk3L   28ck3Hk3L
  32c2k2Hk3L   16c3kHk3L C 16k5Hk2L C 20ck4Hk2L   12c2k3Hk2L   32c3k2Hk2L
  16c4kHk2L C 32ck5HkL C 64c2k4HkL C 32c3k3HkL C 16c2k5H C 32c3k4H C 16c4k3H :
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F D9c3k2Hk4Lt4 C 44c4kHk4Lt4 C 32c5k4Lt4   72c3k3Hk3Lt4
  496c4k2Hk3Lt4   640c5kHk3Lt4   256c6k3Lt4 C 144c3k4Hk2Lt4
C 632c4k3Hk2Lt4 C 16c5k2Hk2Lt4   640c6kHk2Lt4   256c7k2Lt4
C 288c4k4HkLt4 C 1408c5k3HkLt4 C 1024c6k2HkLt4 C 144c5k4H t4 C 704c6k3H t4
C 512c7k2H t4 C 27c2k3Hk4Lt3 C 144c3k2Hk4Lt3 C 172c4kHk4Lt3 C 64c5k4Lt3
  216c2k4Hk3Lt3   1656c3k3Hk3Lt3   3552c4k2Hk3Lt3   3200c5kHk3Lt3
  1024c6k3Lt3 C 432c2k5Hk2Lt3 C 2376c3k4Hk2Lt3 C 2504c4k3Hk2Lt3
  1504c5k2Hk2Lt3   3200c6kHk2Lt3   1024c7k2Lt3 C 864c3k5HkLt3
C 5184c4k4HkLt3 C 8320c5k3HkLt3 C 4096c6k2HkLt3 C 432c4k5H t3
C 2592c5k4H t3 C 4160c6k3H t3 C 2048c7k2H t3 C 27ck4Hk4Lt2 C 164c2k3Hk4Lt2
C 288c3k2Hk4Lt2 C 192c4kHk4Lt2 C 32c5k4Lt2   216ck5Hk3Lt2
  1924c2k4Hk3Lt2   5840c3k3Hk3Lt2   8368c4k2Hk3Lt2   5760c5kHk3Lt2
  1536c6k3Lt2 C 432ck6Hk2Lt2 C 2984c2k5Hk2Lt2 C 6028c3k4Hk2Lt2
C 2416c4k3Hk2Lt2   5296c5k2Hk2Lt2   5760c6kHk2Lt2   1536c7k2Lt2
C 864c2k6HkLt2 C 6400c3k5HkLt2 C 15904c4k4HkLt2 C 16512c5k3HkLt2
C 6144c6k2HkLt2 C 432c3k6H t2 C 3200c4k5H t2 C 7952c5k4H t2 C 8256c6k3H t2
C 3072c7k2H t2 C 9k5Hk4Lt C 72ck4Hk4Lt C 188c2k3Hk4Lt C 192c3k2Hk4Lt
C 64c4kHk4Lt   72k6Hk3Lt   864ck5Hk3Lt   3648c2k4Hk3Lt   7456c3k3Hk3Lt
  8064c4k2Hk3Lt   4480c5kHk3Lt   1024c6k3Lt C 144k7Hk2Lt C 1368ck6Hk2Lt
C 4336c2k5Hk2Lt C 5056c3k4Hk2Lt   608c4k3Hk2Lt   6016c5k2Hk2Lt   4480c6kHk2Lt
  1024c7k2Lt C 288ck7HkLt C 2880c2k6HkLt C 10400c3k5HkLt C 17408c4k4HkLt
C 13696c5k3HkLt C 4096c6k2HkLt C 144c2k7H t C 1440c3k6H t C 5200c4k5H t
C 8704c5k4H t C 6848c6k3H t C 2048c7k2H t C 8k5Hk4L C 40ck4Hk4L C 64c2k3Hk4L
C 32c3k2Hk4L   100k6Hk3L   720ck5Hk3L   2096c2k4Hk3L   3200c3k3Hk3L
  2752c4k2Hk3L   1280c5kHk3L   256c6k3L C 128k7Hk2L C 796ck6Hk2L C 1712c2k5Hk2L
C 1104c3k4Hk2L   1152c4k3Hk2L   2240c5k2Hk2L   1280c6kHk2L   256c7k2L
C 256ck7HkL C 1792c2k6HkL C 4864c3k5HkL C 6400c4k4HkL C 4096c5k3HkL
C 1024c6k2HkL C 128c2k7H C 896c3k6H C 2432c4k5H C 3200c5k4H C 2048c6k3H C 512c7k2H :
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